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INTRODUCTION
As demonstrated in the Defendants' and Appellants' Brief, Defendants
completely and/or substantially and materially perfonned all of their obligations and
duties under the Settlement Agreement and are entitled to a satisfaction of judgment.
However, because Red Bridge refused to release and satisfy the judgment according to
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants were compelled to seek judicial
relief by filing their Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment. In ruling on Defendants'
Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment, the District Court committed reversible error in
several significant respects which have been detailed by Defendants in their opening
brief.
As a consequence of the district court's error, Red Bridge received a staggering
and unwarranted economic windfall. Red Bridge intentionally took advantage of the
Court's procedural errors by presenting the case in a false and misleading light. Red
Bridge has received and retained the full fruits of Defendants' performance of the
Settlement Agreement, and has been awarded the full an1ount of the judgment as an
unwarranted double recovery. Such inequity in light of Defendants' performance
under the Settlement Agreement highlights the district court's reversible errors.
The resolution of the parties' dispute required the district court to receive and
consider evidence to determine whether (i) there was complete or substantial
performance of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, (ii) whether there was a mutual
or unilateral mistake in the Settlement Agreement that relieved Defendants of
1
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performance, (iii) whether Red Bridge had waived Defendants' performance as to one
issue, (iv) and whether Red Bridge acted in good faith in negotiating a development
agreement, and, ultimately, whether the judgment was satisfied. The resolution of
these factual issues required an evidentiary hearing. The district court's refusal to
permit the presentation of evidence under these circumstances constitutes reversible
error.
Defendants contend that not only did they comply with all the requirements and
conditions of the Settlement Agreement, thereby entitling them to a release and
satisfaction of the $2,000,000 Stipulated Judgment, but that it was clear error for the
Court to allow Red Bridge to retain the substantial monetary and property benefits of
Defendants' performance under the Settlement Agreement while at the same time
permitting Red Bridge to keep and pursue collection of the full amount of the
Stipulated Judgment, without requiring a valuation and accounting of what Defendants
had given Red Bridge in performance under the Settlement Agreement.
In denying Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction, the District Court erred, inter
alia: (I) by refusing to allow Defendants an evidentiary hearing to resolve questions of
fact concerning their performance of the terms of the Settlement Agreement (2) by
refusing to allow evidence of the parties' mutual mistake concerning an errant legal
description of property included and attached to the Settlement Agreement; (3)
incorrectly interpreting Utah law with respect to mistake, either mutual or unilateral;
(4) by refusing to permit evidence on the question of Red Bridge's waiver; (5) by
2
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failing to provide any ruling or basis upon which the Court denied Defendants' Motion
for Satisfaction; (6) by ignoring evidence and failing to determine that the Defendants
had substantially complied with the material tenns of the Settlement Agreement, and
granting Red Bridge an unjustified and improper double recovery.
ARGU1V1ENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DE~-YING DEFENDA..NTS'
l\10TION FOR SATISFACTION SHOULD BE REVERSED.

A.

Defendants Performed Their Obli2:ations Under the Settlement
Arrreement and Vvere Entitled to a Satisfaction of Jud~ent.

In Red Bridge's Statement of Facts and argument, it argues incon-ectly that the
tem1s of the Settlement Agreement were not perfon11ed by Defendants which thus
justified the District Court's denial of Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment.

See Appellees' Brief at Statement of Facts, pp. 7-8 and Argument, generally. However,
Red Bridge ignores undisputed facts demonstrating Defendants' performance, misstates
the actual requirements of the Settlement Agreement in order to justify its en-oneous
position, and ignores Defendants' right to an evidentiary hearing on disputed facts.
For example, Red Bridge makes the argument that Defendants had not performed
under §4(c) of the Settlement Agreement because they had "not transferred title to the
Strip Parcels to Red Bridge." Id. at p. 7. However, Defendants were never required to
transfer title to the Strip Parcels to Red Bridge under the Settlement Agreement unless the
parties were unable to negotiate in good faith to enter into a mutually agreeable
development agreement. See Settlement Agreement, generally. As conceded by Red
3
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Bridge, the parties had in fact negotiated to enter into a mutually agreeable development
agreement. In fact, Defendants had submitted evidence demonstrating that Red Bridge
had accepted the Elim Valley Development Agreement in satisfaction of this requirement
under the Settlement Agreement. See R. at 786; 895; 922. Moreover, the district court
reached the same conclusion. Instead of conceding this point, as it had below, Red
Bridge perpetuates the erroneous position that Defendants have not performed under the
Settlement Agreement. 1
Although Red Bridge inaccurately represents that all terms of the Settlement
Agreement had not been performed by Defendants, the reality is that Defendants had in
fact materially performed all conditions of the Settlement Agreement and were entitled to
a satisfaction of judgment. Because space limitations of this Reply Brief do not permit
another recitation of the facts and evidence demonstrating Defendants' performance,
Defendants refer the Court to Appellants' Brief, which sets forth in detail the facts and
evidence demonstrating Defendants' performance under the Settlement Agreement. See
Appellants' Brief, including Statement of Facts Nos: 9 -14; 26; 35-36; 47; 50. Red
Bridge's attempt to create artificial failures on Defendants' part with respect to
compliance under the Settlement Agreement is without merit.
Next, Red Bridge's Brief casually skips over the important details of Defendants'
performances and instead creates a fiction by arguing that because Defendants have not
When it became apparent to Red Bridge that the Defendants had fully performed under
the Settlement Agreement, Red Bridge began to demand additional performances that
were not required under the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 810).
1
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paid the full amount of the judgment, they are of course not entitled to satisfaction of the
judgment. See Appellee's Brief at p. 15. This argument is illogical and ignores the
express terms of the Settlement Agreement which do not require the Defendants to pay
the ''judgment" amount to entitle them to satisfaction of the judgment. Rather, the
Defendants were entitled to a satisfaction of judgment upon completion of specified
performances, which were in lieu of payment of the ''judgment." And, as Defendants
have demonstrated, such perfonnances were completed. The attempt to manufacture
breaches of the Settlement Agreement on Defendants' part, when no material breaches
are present, is a common theme throughout Red Bridge's arguments, both below and
perpetuated on appeal. However, the record does not support Red Bridge's arguments.
Red Bridge further argues that Defendants were required to file a motion to set
aside the judgment instead of a motion to satisfy the judgment. Id. at at p. 15. However,
this reasoning is faulty and nonsensical because it again ignores the express tenns of the
Settlement Agreement which require that upon performance of the conditions of the
Settlement Agreement, Red Bridge was required to file a satisfaction of judgment which it refused to do. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5 8B and Utah Res. Int 'I
G

Inc. v. Mark Tech, Corp., 2014 UT 60,342 P.3d 779, and pursuant to the terms of the

Settlement Agreement, Defendants filed their Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment in
order to obtain the relief to which they were entitled. In doing so, the Defendants applied
to the Court for judicial action in satisfying the judgment. It makes little sense to argue

5
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that Defendants were required to file a motion to set aside the judgment where the
Settlement called for a satisfaction of judgment.
B.

Defendants' Performance Does Not Present A Non-Justiciable
Question Because An Actual Or Innninent Clash Of Legal Rights
Between The Parties Still Exists.

Relying on irrelevant precedent, Red Bridge next asserts that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to reach the merits of the issues presented on appeal because any decision
rendered regarding Defendants' performance under the Settlement Agreement would
constitute an advisory opinion. See Red Bridge's Brief at 16-17. This is simply
incorrect. Although Red Bridge is correct that courts are not a forum for rendering
advisory opinions, it fails to recognize that such is only the case"[ w]here there exists no
more than a difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a piece of
legislation to a situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find
themselves." Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ~ 5, 97 P.3d 722 (quoting Redwood
Gym v. Salt Lake County Conun., 624 P.2d 1138, 48 (Utah 1981).

For example, in the principal case relied on by Red Bridge, the Utah Transit
Authority (''UTA") brought a cause of action against the union stennning from failed
collective bargaining negotiations. See Utah Transit Authority v. Local 382 of the
Anialgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75,289 P.3d 582. While the dispute was on

appeal, the parties negotiated and entered into a new collective bargaining agreement.
See id. at~~ 9-12. In finding that the "subsequent negotiation and new collective

bargaining agreement rendered the case moot and accordingly non-justiciable[,]" the
6
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Court reasoned that "\\rhere the issues that v;.rere before the trial court no longer exist, the
appellate court will not review the case. An appeal is moot if during the pendency of the
appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the
relief requested impossible or ofno legal effect.'' Id. at~ 14 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
In essence, "[t]he defining feature of a moot controversy is the lack of capacity for
the court to order a remedy that will have a meaningful impact on the practical positions
of the parties." Id. at~ 24. In other words, "[i]n order to constitute a justiciable
controversy, a conflict over the application of a legal provision must have sharpened into
an actual or irmninent clash of legal rights and obligations between the pa1ties thereto."

Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ~ 5 (quoting Redwood Gym, 624 P.2d at 1148).
Here, the conflict regarding whether Defendants are entitled to a satisfaction of
judgment remains an actual or innninent clash of legal rights and obligations between the
parties. Unlike the dispute in Utah Transit Authority, this dispute has not been resolved
while on appeal and does not constitute a hypothetical application for the future. Further,
this dispute was at issue and presented to the district court. Therefore, because this
Q

Court's decision regarding whether the district court erred can still provide relief that will
have a legal effect upon the parties, such a decision is not an advisory opinion.
Red Bridge attempts to complicate the issue by asserting that because Defendants'
underlying motion was for a satisfaction of judgment rather than a motion to enforce the
settlement agreement or motion to set aside the judgment, that this Court's opinion on
7
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whether Defendants performed can only be construed as an advisory opinion. See Red
Bridge's Brief, at 16. As set forth above, this argument is without merit and simply an
attempt to confuse the issue. This appeal is grounded on the district court's eITor in
refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing, incorrect application of the law, and disregard
of undisputed facts, among other things. The styling or naming of Defendants'
underlying Motion does not make a decision regarding whether the district court erred in
denying Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment an advisory opinion. Having
been denied their right to satisfaction of judgment by the error of the district court,
Defendants cannot be denied the right of appeal because they did not go back to the
district court with the same arguments under a differently titled motion.

C.

The District Court Erred by Failing to Make Sufficient Findings and
Conclusions and by Failing to Conduct an Evidentiary Hearing.

Red Bridge incorrectly claims there was no error below because the district court
did not "convert" the parties' motions into cross motions for summary judgment.
However, Red Bridge's argument disregards the district court's clear and unambiguous
statement that it was considering the motions as cross motions for summary judgment.
(Tr. at 5). Case law establishes that, "[i]t is the substance, not the labeling, of a [pleading]
that is dispositive in determining the character of the [pleading]." State, in interest of

J.D., 2013 UT App 14, i12, 295 P.3d 1167 (quotations and citation omitted). This
provides that the district court has discretion in deciding the nature of and how a pleading
is characterized.
8
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\7'/b.ile Red Bridge asserts there is no proper procedure for the district court to
convert the Defendants' motion to a summary judgment motion, such argument cannot
pretend it didn't happen. The record is clear that it was the district court's decision to
treat the motions of the parties as cross motions for summary judgment. The district
court converted the parties' motions, treated them as cross motions for summary
judgment, and then committed reversible error in failing to apply legal standards to his
resolution of the motions. Because the district comt treated Defendants' motion as a
motion for summary judgment, the district court was then obligated to meet the
evidentiary and procedural requirements applicable to motions for summary judgment,
including the requirement that sunu11aI)' judgment can be entered only when the record
shows "that there is no genuine issue of material fact". (Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)) .. In this
case, the district court erred by granting Red Bridge's motion where there were multiple
and genuine issues of material fact, and by failing to detail the district court's findings
and conclusions.
Even beyond the district court's failure to comply with the specific requirements
relating to motions for summary judgment, the district court failed to comply with Rule
52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and provide a statement explaining the grounds
· for its decision. Rule 52 requires that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without ajury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon ...." Utah R. Civ. P. 52. "It is well settled in this
jurisdiction that failure to make findings of fact on material issues is error, and is
9
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ordinarily prejudicial." Duncan v. Henunelwright, 186 P.2d 965, 968-69 (Utah 1947).
"Moreover, such factual findings must be complete and detailed." Anned Forces Ins.

Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ~~ 27-28, 70 P.3d 35.
In this case, the district court failed to give any explanation for its ultimate
decision to deny Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction and grant Red Bridge's motion, and
it failed to make the required detailed findings orally or written. On this point, the entire
extent of the district court's decision was made orally as follows:
Okay. Well, as far as the motion-motion for satisfaction of judgement, I will
deny that motion. I don't think it's well taken on many fronts but clearly not
sufficient for either substantively and maybe procedurally. So I'm going to deny
that.
Tr., 59: 14-18. This was the entire breadth of the court's ruling with respect to the
Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment. Obviously, such is insufficient and
does not meet the requirements of Rule 52. The district court failed to make any further
fmdings and did not provide any reasoning behind its blanket denial of Defendants'
motion. Particularly, the district court never made any finding that there were no genuine
issues of material fact that would make summary judgment appropriate. In light of this
lack of findings, the district court should have allowed and heard evidence in order to
make determinations of factual disputes. The district court's failure is prejudicial and
requires that this Court reverse the district court's order and/or remand the matter to the
district court with instructions to follow proper procedure and receive the necessary
evidence in order for appropriate findings to be made.
10

SLC_2568958

Next, Red Bridge asserts that the district cout1 properly considered evidence. See
Appellee's Brief at p. 18. This disregards the plain record of the hearing. \\lbile Red
Bridge can only point to the pretrial submission of limited stipulated facts and exhibits,
the parties' submission of certain agreed upon facts and exhibits were not the extent of
the evidence intended to be introduced by the parties. (R. at 2185). Indeed, as specified
in the pretrial order, the parties came prepared to offer evidence and testimony that the
district court refused to take or hear. Id. The pretrial order provided that the hearing
would be an evidentiary hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, and tlrroughout
opening argument, counsel for the Defendants stated his intention and request to put on
evidence. (Tr. 5: 10 - 7: 1). The district com1 acknowledged the evidentiary purpose of
the hearing at the outset, but then, without explanation disregarded the request to put on
evidence by Defendants' counsel and ruled without allowing any evidence and testimony.
Importantly, the district court never provided any reason to suppmi its decision or
identified any factual basis for its decision. This leaves the parties and this Court
guessing why the district court did what it did, and emphasizes the error and prejudice
caused by the district comi's failure to allow evidence and provide required findings.
Thus, it is demonstrably untrue to suggest that the Court conducted an evidentiary
hearing.
To the extent the district Com1's Order states it relied on Stipulated Facts and
Exhibits, these Stipulated Facts and Exhibits were simply basic, foundational background
facts and certain exhibits the parties agreed upon in advance of the evidentiary hearing.
11
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c.

\i4;J

There were a number of material facts in dispute that required resolution through the
taking of evidence. Indeed, the Defendants came prepared with additional exhibits and
witnesses as was anticipated by the parties pursuant to the pretrial order. The stipulated
facts or exhibits were insufficient and incomplete for the district court to make any
decision on the contested issues, let alone provide a basis for a required, well-reasoned
decision. This further highlights how the district court's lack of findings or conclusions
has left the parties guessing about how and on what basis the district court reached its
decision.
Moreover, even Red Bridge is guessing or assuming what the district court did or
did not rely on. Specifically, Red Bridge asserts that the district court made its decision
as a matter of law. Appellee Brief, pg. 19. This is incorrect, as the district court never
stated this conclusion but instead acknowledged that it was making its decision on several
fronts, including substantive and "maybe procedural[]" reasons. Tr., 59: 14-18. Red
Bridge's attempt to argue that the court made its determination as a matter of law is
unsupported because the district court provided no findings or conclusions that could
support such an argument, even as to the legal basis for the Court's decision.
Next, Red Bridge erroneously asserts that no parole evidence could have been
considered because the settlement agreement was an integrated document. This position
is unsupported by the clear weight of Utah law. Utah law requires the review of parole
evidence to determine an issue of mistake, even in the face of an integrated document.
See Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT ,I 20, 182 P.3d 326; E&H Land, Ltd. v.
12
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Farmington City, 2014 UT App 237, ~ 25, 336 P.3d 1077 (holding '"It is true that
Tangren recognized that 'mistake' is one of several grounds upon which courts may

consider 'extrinsic evidence in support of an argument that the contract is not valid'
despite a clear integration clause ... But the issue in Tangren "'ras whether parol
evidence was admissible to demonstrate whether or not a contract was integrated, not
whether a mutual mistake warranted refonnation of the parties' agreement ...
Consequently, the district court erred when it determined that the REPC's integration
clause precluded any consideration of extrinsic evidence to resolve E&H's reformation
due to mutual mistake claim.") (citation omitted); Tf'est One Trust Co. v. A1orrison, 861
P .2d I 058, I 068 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The foregoing case law affin11atively establishes
that it is error for the district court to preclude consideration of extrinsic evidence to
resolve a claim of mistake. Consequently, the district court could not have ruled as a
matter of law because the issue of mistake, asserted by Defendants, was a question of fact
that required the consideration of extrinsic evidence.
Finally, the issue on appeal regarding the district court's failure to hold an
evidentiary hearing was clearly preserved by the Defendants. Utah law requires that in
order to "preserve [an] issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before the trial
court." Hart v. Salt Lake County, Com 'n, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997). As set forth
herein, the district comi issued notice of an evidentiary hearing upon which the
Defendants relied. [R. at 2156]. The Defendants came to the hearing prepared to present
evidence and testimony. The district court then requested opening arguments. (R. at
13
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3891, Tr. pp. 3-5). Counsel for the Defendants stated his intention and request to put on
evidence and clarified the court's instructions by asking "you'd like some argument at
this point prior to putting on evidence?" To which the court replied: "you can make an
opening statement, if you like." (Id.; Tr. pp. 4-5) (emphasis added).
Based on the court's instructions, both parties presented their opening arguments
and Defendants stated what the evidence would show, as is typical of an opening
argument. Defendants provided a proffer in their opening argument of what their
evidence would present. (Tr. 5:10 - 7:1; 7:3 - 8:7; 11 :7-22). Then the district court
unexpectedly ruled at the close of the opening statements without providing the
Defendants the chance to counter or proffer anything further, or to present evidence. Tr.,
59: 14-18. Defendants properly raised and preserved the issue of their intent and request
to put on evidence at the evidentiary hearing. In addition, the Defendants proffered and
explained the evidence it would present as the Defendants identified previously in their
Appellant Brief, with the anticipation of presenting the evidence. See Appellants' Brief,
pgs. 28-30. Pursuant to Hart, the Defendants have sufficiently preserved this issue for
appeal.
In sum, the district court committed reversible error in failing to take evidence and
to make proper findings and conclusions.

14
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D.

The District Court Failed to Allow or Hear Evidence of a 1v1utual
:Mistake.

The district court erred in precluding Defendants from presenting evidence
regarding mutual mistake. Utah law is clear that a district court errs ,:vhen it fails to
consider extrinsic evidence when a mutual mistake is asserted. See Wolf Afountain
Resorts, LC v. ASC Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 425, ,, 9-12, 268 P.3d 872. Particularly, in
FVolf A1ountain, "Wolf Mountain offered extrinsic evidence [of a mutual mistake], but the

district court refused to consider that evidence." Id. at, 11. The Utah Court of Appeals
detennined that the failure to consider the extrinsic evidence "was error by the district
court." Id.; see also E & H Land, Ltd. v. Fannington City, 2014 UT App 237, ~ 24,336
P.3d 1077 ("Based on the Tangren decision, the district court refused to consider any
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent and awarded Farmington summary judgment on
the reformation claim. We conclude that the district court should have considered
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent."); TY. One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058,
I 061 (Utah Ct. App. 1993 )("If the mutual mistake is established by clear and convincing
evidence, a document may be refom1ed. Therefore, in this case the trial court should
have considered extrinsic evidence that may have demonstrated that the parties intended
the subject properties to be held as partnership assets, rather than as joint tenancies with
rights of survivorship."(emphasis added)).

15
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In this case, Defendants proffered to the Court and were prepared to offer evidence
concerning mutual mistake that would have established the same. 2 Contrary to Red
Bridge's assertions, Defendants directly addressed the evidence they intended to
introduce regarding the asserted mutual mistake. At the hearing, Defendants' counsel
expressly stated to the court what the evidence would show (with the understanding they
would later be able to actually present and admit such evidence). 3 This evidence includes

2

Red Bridge incorrectly states that Defendants conceded that the district court should not
consider evidence regarding mistake. In fact, the portion of the hearing transcript to
which Red Bridge cites discusses the colloquy between counsel and the court regarding
the general parol evidence rule regarding whether parol evidence may be received on
integrated contracts (on which, as discussed herein, Red Bridge and the Court were in
error). However, from a reading of the identified portions of the transcript, as well as the
entire transcript, Defendants' counsel clearly argues that the Defendants intended to offer
and admit extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the mutual mistake. Tr. 12:6-14. The
Defendants did not concede that evidence should not be received on the issue of mutual
mistake; rather, the Defendants stated their intent to introduce such evidence while at the
same time informing the court that even from a reading of the Settlement Agreement,
therewasevidenceofamistake. Id. atp. 16.
3

Defendants' counsel stated at the hearing,
At the time the settlement was reached, I don't think that any of the parties
contemplated that that strip parcel included that triangle of Elim Valley property. The
entire discussions of the settlement agreement, the entire negotiation was with Mellon
Valley on its property. This litigation, they had an expert, they had other individuals
that identified the strip parcels, they knew about them, and they knew what Elim
Valley owned and didn't own. The legal description, in the haste of getting the
settlement agreement completed before trial, did include that triangle. And that is, I
would argue is a mutual mistake.

Tr. 11: 8-18. In addition to this evidence, Defendants also asserted that the language of
the Settlement Agreement supports that there was an error in the legal description. In
sum, the parties, at the time of entering the Settlement Agreement, were unaware that a
16
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the language of the Settlement Agreement, testimony of individuals with knowledge
concern the engineering and legal description errors, documentary history, and testimony
of the parties regarding their intent and reliance on the incorrect legal description.
However, prior to hearing any evidence, the district court curiously denied Defendants'
motion as to mutual mistake based on the "odds."4 Such an analysis is both unbecoming
a judicial proceeding (which should not be a game of chance) and in error. In sum, the
district court erred in failing to allow Defendants to present evidence regarding mutual
mistake.
E.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Allow and Consider Evidence of
a Unilateral Mistake.

The Defendants have identified that the district court made an error of law by not
allowing or considering evidence of a unilateral mistake. If the district court had taken
evidence and determined that a mutual mistake did not occur it should have then
considered evidence concerning a unilateral mistake. Pai.1icularly, at the heaiing, the
Defendants argued facts that would be presented to support a unilateral mistake. Tr. 11:

7-22.
Q

parcel owned by a third party was included in the legal description. See Appellants' Brief
Facts, 1115-25.
The district court stated, "About parole [sic] evidence. And I mean, your theory is a
theory, but f011y-to-one odds. I don't get that. Fifty-to-one odds, probably. So if you
think your theory is worth fifty-to-one odds, I can see maybe approaching that way." Tr.
59:6-10. Based on this analysis (or lack thereof) the district court denied Defendants'
motion for satisfaction of judgment. Tr. 60:6-11.
4

17
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Defendants contend that they can establish the required showing to allow a
reformation of the Agreement on the basis of a unilateral mistake. See Rothe v. Rothe,
787 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)("The Utah Supreme Court has also clarified that
unilateral mistake in the formalization of a writing may also provide an appropriate basis
for refonnation."); Davis v. Mulholland, 475 P.2d 834, 835 (Utah 1970)("Essential
conditions to [unilateral mistake] are (I) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence
that to enforce the contract as actually made would be unconscionable. (2) The matter as
to which the mistake was made must relate to a material feature of the contract. (3)
Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary
diligence by the party making the mistake. (4) It must be possible to give relief by way of
rescission without serious prejudice to the other party except the loss of his bargain.").
With respect to the foregoing, Defendants explained below that holding the
Defendants to this mistake "would be of great consequence because Mellon Valley
complied in every other aspect of this ... agreement." Tr. 14: 23-25. Enforcing the
mistake would mean that Red Bridge would receive an incredible windfall and essentially
collect two times the amount of the agreed upon value of the Agreement. Red Bridge has
retained the entire benefit of the Defendants' performances under the Settlement
Agreement in addition to collecting on the $2 million judgment all on the basis of the
error or mistake in the legal description as set forth herein.
Moreover, the mistake occurred despite the Defendants exercise of ordinary
diligence. Defendants reasonably relied on a sunrey and a sunrey map to include the
18
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con-ect legal description of land actually owned by the Defendants. See Appellant Brief
Facts~ ~ 16. In addition~ relief through reformation is available without serious prejudice
to Red Bridge. The I/10 th of an acre at issue did not hann Red Bridge's stated purpose of
requiring the easements across the Strip Parcels as part of the Settlement Agreement,
which was to allow for two access points on each Strip Parcel. See Tr. 13:19-25; see also
Appellant Brief Fact, ,r 19. In sum, the district court erred and misinterpreted the law in
failing to allow Defendants to present evidence regarding unilateral mistake. Moreover,
Defendants have also established they were prepared to introduce probative evidence of
such a mistake.
F.

Defendants Substantially Complied \vith the Settlement A~ffeement.

Red Bridge does not and cannot cite to any law in its attempt to oppose
Defendants' argument regarding substantial compliance. Red Bridge's unsupported
assertions are insufficient to challenge the clear case law applicable to contracts. Red
Bridge admits that principles of contract law apply to settlement agreements. (Appellee
Brief, p. 21 ). Utah law provides that "[ o]nly a material breach will excuse further
performance by the non-breaching pa11y." Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ,I 26,303
P. 3d 1030. Determining a material breach is a question of fact. Orlob v. T.flasatch Med.
Afgmt., 2005 UT App 430, ,r 26, 124 P.3d 269. The district comi failed to take evidence

to assess the factual question of whether Defendants materially breached the Settlement
Agreement. The Defendants have established that they materially complied with the
Settlement Agreement and Red Bridge cannot be excused from further perfom1ance.
19
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G.

The District Court Erred in its Intemretation and Application of
Waiver.

Red Bridge waived the right to demand the Master Communications Easement be
removed on the Strip Parcels. Red Bridge asserts that its actions did not waive its rights.
This is incorrect. Utah case law establishes that a waiver can be found from a party's
conduct when it establishes an intent to waive or that such conduct is "at least ...
inconsistent with any other intent." Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co., Inc., 831 P .2d 130,
133 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(intemal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, a "[f]ailure
to adhere to the precise terms of the contract, combined with the absence of notice of a
party's intention to insist on strict compliance, is enough evidence to support a finding of
waiver." Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, this Court has established that "one cannot
prevent a waiver by a private mental reservation contrary to an intent to waive, where his
or her actions clearly indicate such an intent." Id. (citation omitted).

In this case, Red Bridge's email and conduct establishe a waiver of any right to
demand that the Master Conununications Easement be removed on the Strip Parcels.
Instead, Red Bridge outlined in its email the title issues requiring to be corrected and
intentionally did not include the Master Communication Easement, which expressed an
intent that can only be consistent with waiver. Notably, Red Bridge has never contended
its omission of the Master Communications Easement was inadvertent or mistaken. In
sum, the implication of Red Bridge's actions is sufficient to establish waiver.

20
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Second, a nom:vaiver provision in a contract is not dispositive as "courts have
concluded that they too may be waived." Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik: 890 P.2d 7,
1On. 5 (Utah Ct. App. l 995)("There is substantial authority against giving literal and full
effect to nom:vaiver provisions; courts have concluded that they too may be
waived.")(internal quotations and citation omitted). Red Bridge incorrectly argues that
the non-waiver provision is dispositive on the issue of waiver. Appelllee's Brief, pg. 28.
However, as provided in Living Scriptures, Inc., Red Bridge's actions still constitute a
waiver in this case. 5 Red Bridge acted consistent with a waiver and the district court
erred in its interpretation and application of waiver.

II.

RED BRIDGE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ITS UNREASONABLE
ATTORNEYS' FEES.
A.

Red Bridge does not Dispute that its Request for Attornevs' Fees
Should be Reversed when the District Court's Prior Ruling is Reversed.

For the reasons already established in the Appellants' Brief, Red Bridge is no
longer the prevailing party and will not be entitled to attorneys' fees. If the district
court's decision regarding the Defendant's motion is reversed, the Defendants will
become the prevailing party and Red Bridge will no longer be entitled to attorneys' fees.
Red Bridge does not dispute this issue in its Appellee Brief.

5

Red Bridge also argues that even if it did waive the issue of the Master Communication
Easement, the judgment lien on the Snip Parcels establishes that the Defendants did not
comply with the Settlement Agreement. However, this issue is irrelevant to the issue of
waiver regarding the Master Communications Easement. The issue of the judgment lien
is addressed by Defendants' previous arguments, including mistake and substantial
performance.
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B.

The District Court Erred in Granting Red Bridge Excessive
Attorneys' Fees.

Red Bridge incorrectly argues that its attorneys' fees do not have to be reasonable
but that its fees were in fact reasonable. Appellee's Brief at pg. 29n. 15. However, Red
Bridge fails to recognize that attorneys' fees must always be reasonable, even if the
contract does not provide that the attorneys' fees must be reasonable. Equitable Life &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P .2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct.App.) ("If provided for by contract,
attorney fees are awarded in accordance with the terms of that contract. Although such an
award is a matter of legal right, it must be reasonable and supported by adequate
evidence."). Further, "[r]easonable attorneys fees are not measured by what an attorney
actually bills, nor is the number of hours spent on the case determinative in computing
fees." Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985).
The court must also consider "the provision in the Code of Professional
Responsibility which specifies the elements that should be considered in setting
reasonable attorneys fees." Id. Important factors, among others, include the difficulty of
the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of
the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar services, the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise
and experience of the attorneys involved." Id. Importantly, "[a] trial court abuses its
discretion when its fee award is unreasonable." Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C., 2006
UT App 305, ~ 25, 145 P.3d 1146.
22
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In this case, the district court erred by granting Red Bridge excessive attorneys'
fees. Defendants raised an objection to Red Bridge's excessive attorneys' fees and the
district cow1 improperly denied their objection. As already discussed in Appellants'
Brief, (1) Red Bridge's counsel's hourly rate was excessive at $550 per hour and (2) Red
Bridge's counsel was inefficient. Red Bridge's counsel billed approximately 36% more
than Defendants' counsel at an hourly rate over double that of Defendants' counsel. This
establishes the excessive amount of Red Bridge's attorneys' fees. \\Thile Red Bridge
states that the district court considered the correct factors and thus did not err, it fails to
acknowledge that a result of unreasonable attorneys' fees is en-or. The hourly amount
Red Bridge's counsel charged and the time Red Bridge's counsel billed for a motion for
satisfaction of judgment proceedings was unreasonable. The district court erred in
accepting Red Bridge's claims and blanket statements about reasonableness without
looking further into assessing the reasonableness of Red Bridge's efficiency and hourly
rates and thus granted excessive fees. In sum, the district court e~ed in granting Red
Bridge unreasonable attorneys' fees and its order on fees should be reversed or be
remanded for further findings.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons and upon the authority set forth herein, Appellant requests the
Court of Appeals to reverse the Orders appealed from and remand for further
proceedings.
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